

# Cloud-Native Sandboxes for Microservices: Understanding New Threats and Attacks

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Palo Alto Networks)



# About Us



2014: Listed on Nasdaq (NASDAQ: JD)  
2017: Fortune 500 Company (Rank 261)  
2017: More than 1 Billion Active Customer  
2018: Google Invest \$500M



17K+  
Merchant



16K+  
Employee

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Tongbo Luo - Chief AI Security Scientist - JD.com



# About Us



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
# Agenda

- Introduction
- New Challenges
- System Design
  - Overview
  - Core Design Issue
- Parallel Execution and Alignment Analysis
- Case Study and Usage
  - Path Transversal
  - RCE
  - Authentication Bypass
  - Sandbox Escape

# Introduction

- Container = Namespace + cGroup
- Cloud-native and container-based cluster
- Orchestrators - Kubernetes
- Container Security
  - Image Vulnerability
  - Docker/K8s Vulnerability
- Defense
  - Static Image Scanner
  - Dynamic Runtime Prevention/Detection

Image Type	Total Images	Number of Vulnerabilities				
		Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std. Dev.
Community	352,416	199	158	1,779	0	139
Community :latest	75,533	196	153	1,779	0	141
Official	3,802	185	127	791	0	145
Official :latest	93	76	76	392	0	59



Source: A Study of Security Vulnerabilities on Docker Hub

# New Challenges

Problem-Side:

Missing a novel sandbox tool to discover container-based threats.

Opportunity-side:

Rethink the design of traditional sandbox.

New Features to Improve the Detection.

Context-Awareness

Parallel Execution

# Container Sandbox Design - Core Question

**Q1: How to make it convenience to use sandbox in container-based cloud?**

Q2: How to efficiently retrieve and build the context for sandbox?


Q3: How to collect sample behaviors in sandbox?

Q4: How to analyze the sample behaviors beyond existing detection mechanism?

# Q1 - Integrated into Orchestrator

- Using CRD to extend the k8s APIs
  - Introduce our custom-defined-resource type “sandbox”
  - No learning curve to manage container sandboxes.
- Example
  - Using YAML file to create a sandbox
  - With sample data (URL) and context info (image name)

```
apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: CustomResourceDefinition
metadata:
  name: sandbox.contain.er
spec:
  group: contain.er
  version: v1alpha1
  names:
    kind: ParallelSandbox
    image1: tianon/exim4:latest
    image2: tianon/exim4:1.0
  sample:
    type: request
    URI: http://localhost:8080/vul?exploit
  singular: parallelsandbox
  plural: parallelsandboxes
```





# Container Sandbox Design - Core Question

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

Q4: How to analyze the sample behaviors beyond existing detection mechanism?

## Q2 - EnvBuilder

- Rebuild the client's context for environment-sensitive detection.
- Input = Sample + Context
  - Explicit Way ( User Upload DockerFile/Image Name)
  - Implicit Way ( Retrieve Context from Orchestrators)

## Q2 - Hard Isolation: Kata or gVisor

Run Sandbox in the Kata (Hypervisor-based Container Runtime)



# Container Sandbox Design - Core Question

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# Q3 - Syscall Collection

- **Sysdig**
  - based-on tracepoint + vring buffer
- eBPF -- enhancements to BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter)
  - BPF Compiler Collection (bcc)
  - Linux 4.x series
- auditd
  - Linux Audit system
  - Integrated to kernel since v2.6.9

# Container Sandbox Design - Core Question

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
Q3: How to collect sample behaviors in sandbox?

**Q4: How to analyze the sample behaviors beyond existing detection mechanism?**

# Parallel Execution and Alignment Analysis

# Parallel Execution

1. Run Two containers created from the same image in parallel.
2. Feed two similar inputs to each container at the same time.
3. Collected behaviours.
4. Find the Differences between two behaviours.





# Raw Data to Syscall Sequence

- **Raw Data:**

ruby3760A [27726, 21:43:14, >] [puma, 3818, 1, 14039, 18] [getsockopt, net] Data  
Container Metadata Caller's Info Syscall Info buffer  
name [event\_num, time, direction] [proc\_name, pid, vpid, tid, vtid] [call\_type, call\_catalog]

1. Group syscalls based on container-name and pid
2. Extract the syscall name
3. Map syscall name to an unique char

[open read write read read close] → [1 a q a a 5]

# Performance Issue

- Syscall Sequence is too long
- 1000~5000 syscalls per second per process
- Reduced to 10% ~ 30%


**wait**  
**mutex**  
**mutex**  
**open**  
**fstat**  
**lstat**  
**stat**  
**lstat**  
**stat**  
**close**  
**mutex**



**wait**  
**open**  
**fstat**  
**lstat**  
**stat**  
**lstat**  
**stat**  
**close**




**wait**  
**open**  
**stat**  
**stat**  
**stat**  
**stat**  
**stat**  
**close**



**wait**  
**open**  
**stat**  
**stat**  
**stat**  
**close**


# Scoring Function

- Quality of Scoring Function → Quality of Alignment Result




# Scoring Function

## Traditional Scoring Function Result



## Ideal Result



- Ideal Alignment Result: syscalls from the same stage are aligned.

# Scoring Function

Our Customized Scoring Function for sandbox

$$score(sc1, sc2) = \underbrace{\Lambda(sc1, sc2)}_{\text{Importance}} * \underbrace{\Phi(sc1, sc2)}_{\text{Closeness}} * \underbrace{\Psi(sc1, sc2)}_{\text{Sensitivity}}$$

**Importance**

frequency of  
syscall in  
sequence

Depends on  
the context

accept > fstat

**Closeness**

functionality  
similarity

Depends on  
OS

(read, seek)  
>  
(read, close)

**Sensitivity**

critical to  
perform  
exploit

Depends on  
domain knowledge

chmod > wait

# Case Study and Practical Usage

Effectiveness:

Can we pinpoint exactly exploitation fraction from alignment result?

Can we generalize a pattern for each type of attack?

# Case Study - Path Traversal

(CVE-2018-7490) @ uWSGI PHP plugin

attack `curl http://localhost:8080/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd`

## Additional repeated blocks of path traversal operations

open, fcntl, getdents, getdents, close, stat, stat, stat

Attack  
(proc\_c1)

```
l1hggg-fffgg-fb3k098ijkggg5ddd8efeec425d774fff5d774fff5d774fff5d774ff5d774fff ...  
||||| ||||| | ||||||| |||||||||||  
l1hggg6fffgggf-3k098ijk-gg5ddd8efeec----- ...
```


Legitimate  
(proc\_b1)

```
... 5d774fff5d774fff5d774fff5d774fff5d774fff5d774fff5dhhh3hh4-aj6kek  
| | |  
... -----4ja--kek
```

open, fcntl, read, read, read, close, read, read

# Case Study - Remote Command Execution (RCE)

Vulnerability CVE-2016-4977 @ Spring Security OAuth






# Case Study - Remote Command Execution (RCE)

Vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 @ Jakarta plugin in Apache Struts

- Content-Type arbitrary command execution

Embed injected OGNL script in “Content-Type” field from HTTP header

```
(#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container'])  
(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})))
```




# Case Study - Remote Command Execution (RCE)

Vulnerability CVE-2017-11610 @ Supervisord


- client/server system to monitor/control processes on UNIX-like OSes.

container1: pids [ 12182 12120 6371 6372 6373]

container2: pids [ 12246 12306]



# Case Study - Authentication Bypass




# Case Study - JVM sandbox Escape

Vulnerability CVE-2015-1427 @ Elasticsearch

- full-text search engine
- Bypassing the Sandbox with Reflection:

```
java.lang.Math.class.forName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec("id").getText()
```



- More detail in the white paper
  - Evaluation Result
  - Future work
- Q & A

